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Engaging Regional Partners for Effective Conflict Resolution: 
 Problems and Prospects of the EU’s Strategic Partnerships in Asia
♦ 
 
Saponti Baroowa
♣ 
 
 
Introduction: The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as an Instrument of EU 
External Governance 
 
From  its  initiation  at  the  1998  Franco-British  Summit  at  St-Malo  and  its  formalisation  .and 
institutionalisation at the Cologne and Helsinki Councils in 1999 to its 2005 monitoring mission 
in  Aceh,  Indonesia,  the  EU’s  ESDP  has  made  considerable  progress.  In  fact  ESDP’s  fast 
institutional growth is seen as ‘remarkable in a system where institutional change often proceeds 
at a glacial pace’.
1Of course one may bear in mind that ESDP operations started on a small scale 
and  with  limited  duration,  and  many  of  ESDP  procedures  still  remain  relatively  untested.
2 
Nevertheless, the ESDP’s acquiring an operational capability in 2003, no matter in whatever 
small measure, marked a significant shift from the general nature of the development of CFSP 
which have ‘often proceeded on the basis of rhetorical declarations followed by hesitant and 
inadequate  implementation’.
3  In  2003,  apart  from  undertaking  its  first-ever  civilian  crisis 
management operation, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUPM), and its first-ever 
military  crisis  management  operation,  Concordia,  in  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of 
Macedonia,  the  EU,  for  the  first  time,  extended  its  ESDP  operations  beyond  Europe  by 
undertaking  a  peacekeeping  mission  in  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo.  The  military 
intervention involved 1,800 troops under the command and leadership of France and was known 
as Operation Artemis. It was also assembled in a very short period of time and involved all the 
member  nations  in  the  decision-making  process.  All  previous  operations  involved  ‘a  lengthy 
period  of  advance  planning  and  have  not  really  tested  crisis  decision-making  capability’.
4 
Operation Artemis was therefore ‘a undeniable success from the military point of view’.
5 It also 
marked another first in that it was a fully autonomous EU crisis management operation without 
any  recourse  to  NATO  assets.  Apart  from  the  military  dimension,  the  Congo  operation  was 
significant in that the EU adopted a three-pronged strategy as regards the civilian aspects of the 
intervention.  This  included  the  disarming,  demobilization  and  reintegration  of  armed  groups; 
preparation of a socio-economic rehabilitation program; and the granting of an immediate aid 
package. The operation was therefore the first concrete step towards implementing the EU’s new 
security  doctrine,  ‘by  taking  a  much  longer-term  view  on  crisis  management  and  conflict 
                                                           
    
♦ A previous version of this paper was presented at the Dalhousie University/Halifax Conference on The EU as a 
Global Actor, May 5-6, 2008 
    
♣ Saponti Baroowa is a PhD Candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 
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4 
4 
prevention’.
6 Most significantly, the EU’s successful Congo operation signaled the fact that the 
ESDP has now changed its dimension.  It was no longer only a ‘tool of crisis-management in the 
Balkans’, but ‘has become a necessary device to enhance Europe’s role in the world’.
7  This 
changed dimension also suggest that in future ESDP operations are likely to not only be limited to 
the ‘theatre of necessity in the Balkans’ but also extend to the ‘theatre of choice’ in other parts of 
the world thereby enabling the EU to become a more responsible global player.
8 Significantly 
enough, in July 2005, the EU was engaged in another operation outside the territory of Europe 
and beyond its immediate neighbourhood, in Aceh, Indonesia. The Aceh Monitoring Mission 
(AMM) was given a robust mandate that included ‘monitoring demobilization, decommissioning 
of arms, the withdrawal of government forces, the reintegration of former combatants and the 
launch of a new political process’.
9 
 
The Implications of ESDP’s External Dimension for Asia  
 
ESDP’s external dimension received a fresh impetus in 2005 with the launching of its Aceh 
Monitoring Mission in the Aceh province of Indonesia. ESDP’s first ever foray into Asia also 
marked another step in the direction of the EU attaining the status of a serious global actor and 
also introduced a new dimension to EU-Asia security relations. The robust mandate given to this 
new ESDP mission also meant that the EU was now faced with newer possibilities of emerging as 
an important security actor in Asia. It is significant to note that the EU, in association with the 
ASEAN, was the only international body accepted by all the parties of the Aceh conflict to 
oversee the implementation of the MoU between them. This is a pointer to ‘a telling recognition 
of the international credibility of EU intervention under ESDP’.
10 
  Although the AMM was to be ESDP’s first foray into Asia, several EU Member States 
expressed their apprehension towards undertaking a mission in a region which was 10,000 miles 
away from home and which didn’t constitute much of a European priority. Others however felt 
that ‘a mission in Indonesia would match the vision of those who regarded the Union as a global 
player, not limited to stabilizing its neighbourhood but nurturing more ambitious goals’
11. The 
AMM was an EU-led ESDP mission but it was conducted together with five Association of 
Southeast  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)  member  countries,  namely  Brunei,  Malaysia,  Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand, and with contributions from Norway and Switzerland.  
  The mandate entrusted to the AMM as part of the MoU and as outlined in the Council Joint 
Action of 9 September 2005 involved some demanding and sensitive tasks on the ground for the 
EU Mission.
12 In fact, on the ground the AMM’s activities and responsibilities extended beyond 
the initial provisions. For instance, it was envisaged that the AMM’s task would be to monitor 
decommissioning  but  later  on  it  emerged  that  the  AMM  was  to  take  charge  of  the 
decommissioning process itself largely due to the apprehension of the GAM fighters to hand over 
their weapons to the Indonesian forces and therefore their preference for a reliable and impartial 
third party.
13 
  Despite some initial pre-launch institutional deadlocks and confusions as regards logistics 
and finances, the AMM got underway as planned. The Aceh Conflict was not only a test case of 
                                                           
    
6 Ibid. 
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the  security-development  nexus  in  Asia  in  that  the  conflict  owes  its  origins  so  much  to  the 
political  and  economic  mis-governance  of  the  central  authority  as  to  the  regional  quest  for 
identity and socio-economic self-determination but also in that the devastation brought about by 
the Asian Tsunami reinforced the development woes of the region. Therefore leadership of the 
AMM  provided  a  real  opportunity  to  the  EU  to  address  a  potent  situation  of  the  security-
development nexus in the Asian continent. For, the EU soon found out that it was not only the 
main external organization monitoring peace but also one of the main providers of humanitarian 
assistance  and  development  aid.  Aceh  also  became  a  test  case  where  both  Community 
(Development Aid) and Council (ESDP Missions) instruments could be applied to address the 
larger issues of the security and development in regions outside Europe. Aceh proved how both 
set of instruments could be complementary and mutually reinforcing. The EU had to recognize 
the interplay between the reconstruction efforts and the initiatives to put an end to the conflict in 
Aceh, and therefore had to strike the right balance, for instance, ‘in the aid provided to the coastal 
population, most hit by the tsunami, and to the population of the mainland, which suffered the 
most from the civil war. EU action must be clearly and perceivably directed at building the future 
of the entire region, and not of one particular area or social component.’
14 In the final analysis the 
Aceh experience showed how the EU could combine all the instruments in its tool box towards 
not only securing immediate peace and development but also towards developing and sustaining 
long-term security. 
 
The EU’s Strategy and Approach towards Asia and Asian Security 
 
In its very first report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1997, the Council 
made it clear that ‘Asia continues to constitute key priority for the Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy’
15 Earlier in 1994, the European Commission (EC) produced an overall approach 
to Asia (including Australasia) in a document titled Towards a New Asia Strategy, and followed 
this up in 2001 with a revised and new policy document titled Europe and Asia: A Strategic 
Framework for Enhanced Partnerships. The latter signified a more robust EU approach because 
it  emphasised  the  importance  of  the  security  dimension  as  well  in  relations  with  Asia.  The 
document subdivides Asia into four sub regions: South Asia, South East Asia, North East Asia 
and Australasia.
16 Of the six broad objectives spelt out by the document , from the security point 
of view, mention may be made of the EU’s aim to: a) ‘contribute to peace and security in the 
region and globally, through a broadening of our engagement with the region’; b) ‘contribute to 
the protection of human rights and to the spreading of democracy, good governance and the rule 
of law’; and c) ‘to build  global partnerships and alliances with Asian countries…to strengthen 
our joint efforts on global environmental and security issues’.
17 Also a European Parliament (EP) 
Study of 1999 called for a more active ‘involvement of the CFSP in ‘Asian’ security issues, for 
instance in the areas of confidence-building, proactive and preventive diplomacy and conflict 
resolution’.
18  The  significance  of  real  and  potential  conflict  in  some  of  Asia’s  prolonged 
flashpoints remains high for Europe. This is apparent from ‘the indication, often heard in EP and 
in EU security circles, that the 1992 Petersberg Declaration…may well be worth emulating in 
connection with conflict resolution in Asia’.
19  
                                                           
    
14 Ibid 29-30. 
    
15 Annual Report CFSP 1997, Council of Ministers, point 15a. 
    
16 European Commission, Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships, Brussels 4.9.2001, 
COM(2001) 469 final, p.3. 
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asia/doc/com01_469_en.pdf, 18/04/2006> 
    
17 Ibid., p.15. 
    
18 Georg Wiessala, More than Distant Neighbours: CFSP and Asian Countries, in: Martin Holland (ed.), Common     
Foreign and Security Policy: The first ten years, 2
nd Edition, London/New York 2004), p.96. 
    
19 Ibid, p.97.  
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Potential and Parameters of the EU’s Engagement in Asian Security Scenarios 
 
There is a general agreement in EU strategic discourse that in the conduct of its external relations, 
the EU had successfully maintained its civilian image of a responsible international actor firmly 
committed to the norms of international stability informed by the principles of the United Nations 
(UN) Charter. In fact, ‘UN-centrism in European security cooperation in Asia could offer an 
alternative  Western  identity  for  Europe  in  Asia  and  strengthen  the  EU’s  image  as  a  more 
independent security actor in the region’.
20 It has also been argued that ‘Europe should seek 
constructive involvement in Asian preventive diplomacy and try to utilize its expertise in the field 
of  “soft  security”  which  uses  civilian  means  instead  of  military  means.’
21  In  fact,  ESDP’s 
experiences in conflict resolution and crisis management, together with its frequent use of civilian 
measures, can provide a comparative advantage to the EU to constructively develop a culture of 
security cooperation with Asia in the field of crisis management. It has also been suggested that, 
rather than developing new structures, the EU’s main policy in Asia ‘should be related to the 
strengthening of the development of the existing security institutionalization in Asia.’
22 To this 
end, the EU ‘should give sufficient priority to official Asian security dialogue forums such as the 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)’
23. 
  Although  since  the  early  1990s  the  EU  had  expressed  a  strong  desire  in  widening  the 
security agenda in its relations with ASEAN, the non-compatible security cultures between the 
two organizations meant that ‘for most of the 1990s the EU and ASEAN could not find any 
common  ground  on  conflicting  issues  such  as  the  liberalization  and  democratization  of 
authoritarian regimes, human rights, sustainable development, and ‘good governance’.
24  In recent 
times, however, there is a growing acceptance of the importance of non-traditional security on the 
ASEAN  side  as  a  result  of  a  changing  security  culture  resulting  in  a  ongoing  process  of 
harmonization  of  Asian  and  European  security  cultures.
25  Till  the  ARF  does  not  evolve 
mechanisms for preventive diplomacy, the EU can perhaps insist on cooperation on soft security 
issues, and the experiences of ESDP’s civilian instruments may prove beneficial. For the EU 
therefore, Asia is the most challenging test case for building regional security arrangements.
26 
The EU keeps its out-of-area ESDP missions open to participation by other regional and extra-
regional states. ‘But to give meaning to ideas such as “African ownership” and “open coalitions”, 
the EU needs to channel more resources and expertise to regional organizations in the developing 
world’.
27  
  It  is  also  imperative  for  the  EU  to  practically  harmonize  its  instruments  for  crisis 
management and conflict prevention within a larger framework of a human security approach 
which envisages insecurity as emanating from not only underdevelopment and violent conflict 
situations but also from situations arising due to such events as natural disasters, environmental 
crises and pandemics. In the Asian context, countries in the region are increasingly beginning to 
realize the implications of the human security dimension. Most South East Asian nations have 
generally regarded economic development and prosperity as the cornerstone of their national 
                                                           
    
20 Timo Kivimaki and Jorgen Delman (ed.), The Security Situation in Asia: Changing Regional Security Structure?, 
Copenhagen 2005, p.xi. 
    
21 Ibid, p.iv. 
    
22 Ibid, p.v. 
    
23 Ibid. 
    
24 Jorn Dosch, Changing Security Cultures in Europe and Southeast Asia, Asia-Europe Journal, vol.1, no.4., 
December 2003, p.494. 
    
25 Ibid, p.486. 
    
26 Amitav Acharya, An Asian Perspective: Regional security arrangements in a multipolar world: the EU’s 
contribution, in :Martin Ortega (ed.), Global Views on the European Union, Chaillot Paper 72, Paris November 2004, 
p.93. 
    
27 Ibid, p.100.  
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security and have therefore increasingly realized that it is imperative for them to cooperate on 
human security questions as well. For, any major environmental or human security crisis in one 
country  may  well  have  transboundary  implications  and  therefore  risk  economic  growth  and 
security  of  their  whole  region.  Therefore  in  addressing  human  security  issues,  the  EU  can 
condition its security and development strategies in far-flung Asian regions towards collaborating 
with  regional  and  local  actors  in  mitigating  and  preventing  environmental  crises  and  life-
threatening epidemics. 
 
The EU, India and China: Challenges and Opportunities 
 
The  EU’s  growing  experience  in  civilian  and  humanitarian  crisis  management  may  prove 
beneficial in evolving common strategies with India or China towards addressing humanitarian 
crises-like situations with regional implications. Any direct EU involvement on the ground may 
also introduce a multilateral dimension to any regional humanitarian crisis management operation 
and help in ameliorating the fears and distrust among smaller nations, especially in the context of 
South Asia. In recent years, the emerging political relations between the EU and India have also 
shown greater signs of maturity with the two sides increasingly exhibiting a greater understanding 
of each other’s approach to the erstwhile difficult issues on such questions as related to terrorism 
and human rights.  
          For India, the ‘EU’s influence, in not only the regional but the global security arrangement, 
is and will become incrementally significant, both in terms of its own collective regional identity 
and through the UN.
28 Moreover Europe’s economic and strategic interests in Central Asia and 
the Gulf impinge on India’s parallel interests in the same region.
29 It would therefore be in India’s 
larger interests to fashion bilateral relations with the EU in view of its emergence as a new “pole” 
in an evolving multipolar world and in keeping with the changing realities of the international 
political and economic order.
30 
  The EU for its part also started to recognize India as an emerging global player and an 
important regional power in Asia and therefore vital for its “New Asia Strategy” which seeks to 
improve the EU’s economic and political profile in Asia. In a significant break from the past 
when India was not considered part of Asia and considered too obsessed with its own problems, 
the EU increasingly began to view India as a nation which was now looking beyond its borders 
and comparing itself with the outside world. India’s “Look East” policy was a case in point. The 
EU also regarded India as one of the world’s largest emerging economies whose largely untapped 
market  offered  immense  opportunities.  India  on  the  other  hand  all  the  more  realized  the 
importance of the economic nature of the relations.  
  The decision to hold regular summits between India and the EU as part of their evolving 
Strategic Partnership seem to have corrected ‘a distortion that seemed to have crept in with the 
absurdity  of  India’s  exclusion  from  a  summit-level  Europe-Asia  consultation.’
31  The  Summit 
level interactions also revealed a lot of scope for greater understanding of India’s position in 
contrast to earlier attitudes. For instance, the EU increasingly began to recognize India’s concerns 
on terrorism although the fact remains that India’s approach to terrorism which emphasizes more 
focused and straight-forward solutions do not go down well with the European approach which 
exhibits much more restraint in matters related to terrorism. While most European governments 
would emphasize more on addressing the factors that give rise to terrorism, the Indian position 
emphasizes on the need to arrest terrorism in all its forms irrespective of whatever causes and 
motives that may be involved. These apparent differences notwithstanding, India and EU tried to 
                                                           
    
28 Dixit, ‘Cooperation with Europe: Market and More’, (10 July 2000) Indian Express 
    
29 ibid 
    
30 ‘Editorial’ (30 June 2000) The Hindu  
    
31 Editorial (1 July 2000) The Hindu   
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arrive at some semblance of a common ground as one could gather from the wordings in the EU-
India Joint Declaration at the end of the Lisbon Summit. It declared that both India and the EU   
‘reaffirm  our  unreserved  condemnation  of  terrorism  in  all  its  forms,  wherever  it  occurs  and 
whatever its motives and origin…’
32 The EU also backed India’s proposal for a Comprehensive 
Convention on International Terrorism. The two sides also recognized ‘the need to work together 
more  closely  to  promote  peace,  stability  and  security  in  their  respective  regions  and  beyond 
through bilateral dialogue and confidence building measures among the countries concerned.’ 
While stating their conviction that ‘co-operation in multilateral fora should be one of the priorities 
in  the  future  development  of  our  relationship,’  India  and  the  EU  also  reaffirmed  their 
‘commitment  to  co-operating  closely  in  identifying  and  furthering  common  interests  in 
international  organizations,  particularly  in  the  framework  of  the  United  Nations,  and  in  the 
ASEAN Regional Forum.’  
    The  most  seminal  text  outlining  a  comprehensive  strategic  partnership  arrangement 
between India and the EU, was in the form of the European Commission’s Communication on 
‘An EU-India Strategic Partnership’ of June 2004. The Communication stated that owing to the 
emerging global profile of both the EU and India, the focus of their ‘relations has shifted from 
trade  to  wider  political  issues’  and  therefore  it  is  necessary  to  reinforce  the  already  existing 
cooperation at the UN and other fora by ‘a strategic alliance for the promotion of an effective 
multilateral approach.’
33  It was further stated that India and the EU ‘should co-ordinate and 
harmonize  positions  in  the  preparation,  negotiation  and  implementation  of  major  multilateral 
conventions’  especially  in  the  fields  of  security,  trade,  human  rights,  environment  and 
development.
34  Also  India  and  the  EU  should  co-operate  on  ‘organizational  and  institutional 
restructuring  and  reform  of  the  United  Nations’  and  work  towards  promoting  ‘effective 
multilateralism, especially on implementation of international obligations and commitments and 
the strengthening of global governance.’
35 The proposal therefore laid down the EU’s resolve to 
develop a strategic partnership with India in several key areas.
36 Firstly, the proposal envisaged 
cooperation,  especially  in  multilateral  fora,  on  conflict  prevention  and  post-conflict 
reconstruction; non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; the fight against terrorism and 
organized crime; democracy and human rights; and peace and stability in South Asia. 
  Already the two sides have also expressed their desire to ‘establish an EU-India security 
dialogue  on  global  and  regional  security  issues,  disarmament,  and  non-proliferation.’
37  The 
current  political  dialogue  under  the  broad  framework  of  the  emerging  India-EU  Strategic 
Partnership  may  offer  future  possibilities  to  both  India  and  the  EU  to  evolve  strategies  of 
potential cooperation in the field of crisis management.
38  
  One should also note that there are different strategic interests and priorities in the EU, 
India  and  China.  Hence  the  main  practical  significance  for  the  EU  in  evolving  strategic 
partnerships is to promote responsibility and to co-opt India and China to work together toward a 
more rule-based international order. 
  While recognizing the significance of the upgrade of India-EU relations to the level of a 
strategic partnership, one should however not miss the point that ‘a certain degree of mutual 
                                                           
    
32 ‘India-EU Joint Declaration’ (Lisbon, 28
th June 2000) 
<www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/india/intro/index.htm> 
    
33 European Commission, Communication to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and 
Social Committee, ‘An EU-India Strategic Partnership’ (16 June 2004) COM (2004) 430 final 3 
    
34 ibid 4 
    
35 ibid 
    
36 ibid 4-10 
    
37 European Council Brussels, 7 September 2005, Political Declaration on India-EU Strategic Partnership, in: EU 
Security and Defence: Core Documents 2005, Vol VI, Chaillot Paper 87, Paris March 2006, p.248.  
    
38 For an analysis of the EU-India Strategic Partnership, see Saponti Baroowa, The Emerging Strategic Partnership 
between India and the European Union: A Critical Appraisal, European Law Journal, Vol.13, No.6, Oxford 2007, 
pp.732-749.  
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neglect  and  lack  of  attention  characterizes  Indo-EU  relations  leading  at  times  to  greater 
declarations of intent rather than specific agendas’.
39 This can be attributed partly to ‘differing 
priorities and preoccupation with more pressing political agendas nearer home.’
40  Moreover, 
there is an implicit preference to engage with China on more constructive terms than with India. 
In fact, the ‘number of officials in the Commission dealing with India is only a handful; far less in 
their number and profile to those dealing with China.’
41 This ‘problem is compounded by the fact 
that  there  is  an  inadequate  number  of  experts  who  are  capable  to  understand  the  complex 
problems that India confronts today.’
42 The ‘India-EU strategic partnership is unlikely to be at the 
same level as China even though India does not have the problems encountered in the relationship 
with  China’,  especially  as  regards  human  rights,  the  arms  embargo,  and  the  Chinese  army’s 
growing capabilities in relation to Taiwan.
43 A concomitant problem is that there ‘is often a 
significant difference between the institutions that are keen to move forward with the strategic 
partnership with India and conservative Member States who are apprehensive to give institutions 
too much room to negotiate analogously.’
44 
  Despite  their  long-standing  bi-lateral  disputes  recent  years  have  seen  the  emergence  of 
effective confidence building measures between India and China. China has also increasingly 
begun to view India less as a rival and more as a potentially strong economic and trade partner. 
Although both countries may be seen to be continually trying to exert individual influence among 
smaller nations in regions along their peripheries, the real potential for India-China collaboration 
lies not so much in the resolution of violent conflicts but in addressing human security issues 
such as environmental degradation, natural disasters, epidemics, drugs and migration. The EU 
along  with  the  ASEAN,  India  and  China  can  potentially  forge  a  symbiotic  partnership  in 
addressing such questions related to security and development in Asia. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The roots of regional instability may be complex and may not be merely economic or over the 
control of resources. Some may go back many centuries into history and many may be deep-
rooted in differences of culture, ethnicity, religion, and language. Mere economic instruments and 
top-down approaches may only put many of the unresolved animosities into deep freeze where 
they  may  fester  and  attain  greater  and  unmanageable  proportions.  Therefore  institutional 
capacity-building  from  below  which  takes  into  account  local  realities  and  recognizes  the 
uniqueness of each region’s own development process should be encouraged. 
  Greater integration in the national mainstream of troubled regions may not be enough as it 
may only continue the political and economic alienation but instead, elements of opportunities 
should be identified whereby these backward regions may be integrated in a larger regional and 
transnational system. This would not be antithetical to national interests or sovereignty as some in 
governing establishments would like to believe but would lead to a kind of placebo effect in the 
short-term and sustainable development and security in the long-term.  
          The EU, for its part, could contribute towards a greater sharing of experiences and expertise 
with regional actors, thereby leading to effective partnerships towards finding viable solutions. 
An  alternative  approach  would  be  to  address  the  root  causes  of  instability  and  promote 
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development by engaging regional partner countries to integrate troubled regions in mutually 
benefiting economic and trading systems.  
  In the final analysis, in order to bring its Development and Security policies in line, the EU, 
in addition to its existing development assistance programs in underdeveloped but more stable 
regions, should also allocate greater resources to current and potential conflict prone regions. 
Such an approach would introduce the much-needed development dimension to the prevalent 
security-informed conflict mitigation efforts in such troubled regions. The EU should therefore 
combine its development resources and security instruments towards a more long-term global 
crisis response and development approach rather than resorting to reactive ad-hoc arrangements 
in select situations. 
  The EU lacks a coherent policy towards Asia, and the AMM was the result of not any 
coherent EU policy but mainly due to the fact that the two main external actors in the region, 
namely, the United States and Australia both discredited themselves in their involvements in Iraq 
and East Timor respectively. It is also a fact that many Member States were reluctant to support 
the AMM, in a region far away from the EU and with no real European interests. Aceh may 
therefore  be  viewed  as  an  exception  and  a  contingency  but  it  may  also  be  argued  that  such 
contingencies also provide the real opportunity to the EU to devise a more comprehensive and 
durable approach if the Union is to ultimately emerge as a responsible global actor. The Aceh 
experience can very well provide a direction which could perhaps inform the growth of future EU 
strategies towards addressing issues of security and development in far-flung regions as in Asia 
and elsewhere. 
 
 
 
 
 